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NOTE
Locked Away in SEG “For Their Own Protection”: How Congress Gave
Federal Corrections the Discretion to House Transgender (Trans1) Inmates
in Gender-Inappropriate Facilities and Solitary Confinement
Ash Olli Kulak
INTRODUCTION
Incarcerated transgender people face a unique predicament the day they arrive
at a corrections facility. First, they are processed by corrections officials2 and are
forced to undergo strip searches, often in front of both staff members and other
inmates.3 It may take weeks of waiting in processing before officials are able to
determine the gendered facility in which they will reside.4 They are usually sent to
facilities according to their current genital configuration,5 where they await
transphobic-motivated violence and degrading administrative procedures. 6 Most
*
1

2
3
4
5
6

J.D. Candidate 2018
“Transgender” (or trans) is a term used to describe someone who does not identify with his, her, or their
gender assigned at birth. “Transsexual” is a term coined by medical professionals in the 1950s to
pathologize transgender women as a way of justifying the necessity of medical intervention. See
generally JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED (2002). Many trans people seek medical resources to
transition their bodies to a more desired outcome. Some trans people fall into two binary categories just
like cisgender (or cis, defined as people who are not trans) people. A trans man was assigned female at
birth (AFAB), and he identifies and lives authentically as a man. A trans woman was assigned male at
birth (AMAB), and she identifies and lives authentically as a woman. Some trans people do not identify
as binary and would prefer not to be gendered at all (nonbinary, genderqueer, and agender identities).
Not all trans people are the same, although each face similar stigmas and barriers—be they cultural,
familial, medical, financial—to pursue their authentic selves. This Note will focus on incarcerated trans
people, and in particular trans women, since there is much more research and litigation surrounding
the experiences of trans women in men’s prisons. See Richael Faithful, Transitioning Our Prisons
Toward Affirmative Law: Examining the Impact of Gender Classification Policies on U.S. Transgender
Prisoners, 5 AM. U. MOD. AM. 3, 3 (2009).
Drake Hagner, Note, Fighting for Our Lives: The D.C. Trans Coalition’s Campaign for Humane
Treatment of Transgender Inmates in District of Columbia Correctional Facilities, 11 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 837, 846 (2010).
Id. at 848; see also Paula Rae Witherspoon, My Story, in CAPTIVE GENDERS 209, 211 (Eric A. Stanley &
Nat Smith eds., 2011) (describing her experience being strip searched in front of 200 inmates).
Daren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 520 (2000).
See infra Part II, Section A.
See S. Lamble, Transforming Carceral Logics, in CAPTIVE GENDERS, supra note 3, at 243–44 (“[T]rans
and gender non-conforming people are subject to widespread sexual assault, abuse, and other gross
human rights violations, not only from other prisoners, but from prison staff as well.”); JOEY L. MOGUL,
ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE 107 (Michael Bronski, ed., 2011) (“Within the
sexually charged and violent environment of prisons, transgender women placed in men’s prisons are
easily identifiable targets, relegated to ‘a virtual torture chamber’ of incessant sexual assault and
humiliation at the hands of staff and other prisoners.”); Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of
the Transsexual Prisoner, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. REV. 27, 34 (1995) (“[O]nce a pre-operative, male-tofemale transsexual is placed in an all-male prison population, problems ensue and constitutional claims
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must choose—if they have the choice 7—between the endless abuses in the general
population or extreme isolation in protective custody, which is usually implemented
by placing them in solitary confinement or maximum security (max) units.8 The
damaging effects of continuous violence and isolation seriously deteriorate trans
prisoners’ quality of life.9
To demonstrate this problem, this Note will focus on how the federal criminal
justice system perpetuates these deteriorative health outcomes for transgender
prisoners. This Note begins with the decision to sentence trans people to terms of
incarceration.10 With streams of legislation starting with the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 (SRA),11 Congress has restricted judicial consideration of personal
characteristics and rehabilitation so much that trial judges are anchored to using
prison as the default solution to crime. 12 Judges sentence trans people to terms of
incarceration without considering the near certainty of violence and discrimination
in prison facilities.13 It is up to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and private
corrections corporations contracting with the federal government to ensure that this
history of rights abuses is remedied.14 Their solution, for the most part, has been
isolated segregation units.15
This Note will argue that (1) the Congressional rejection of rehabilitation as a
purpose of punishment—in order to promote uniformity—has resulted in sentencing
determinations without authority to consider factors that increase disparities in
punishments after sentencing, like the high probability of rights violations in
corrections facilities; (2) the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) gives trans
prisoners scant protections from rights violations because it gives the BOP and
corrections corporations too much discretion to make individual “case-by-case”

7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15

are raised.”); Travis Wright Colopy, Note, Setting Gender Identity Free: Expanding Treatment for
Transsexual Inmates, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 227, 268 (2012) (“A national survey reported that 16 percent
[of trans women prisoners] were physically assaulted and 15 percent sexually assaulted.”).
Some transgender prisoners are automatically placed in segregation units upon arrival. See infra Part
II, Section B.
This is not a real choice, and it has not changed since the 1990s. Tedeschi, supra note 6, at 43.
See Lamble, supra note 6, at 244 (“[P]rison is a serious health hazard for queer and trans people.”).
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004), a federal trial judge must go through a three-step
process to determine a defendant’s sentence. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 46 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011) [hereinafter
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT]. The judge must first consider the appropriately formulated
Guidelines range and then consider grounds for departures. The judge can only use remaining
discretion to consider factors justifying variances from the range after these first two steps. This
anchoring effect is purposeful.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012) (establishing a determinate sentencing regime tied to the Sentencing
Guidelines); 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012) (establishing the United States Sentencing Commission).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred
to in [the Sentencing Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance.”).
See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 322 (2011) (“Congress did not intend [in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)]
that courts consider offenders’ rehabilitative needs when imposing prison sentences.”).
For more information about the delegation of authority to punish to BOP and corrections facilities, see
infra Part II.
See Lamble, supra note 6, at 244 (“Trans and gender non-conforming prisoners are regularly placed in
solitary confinement as a ‘solution’ to the problem of sex-segregated prisons.”).
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assessments that determine housing placements; (3) the resulting punishments are
disproportionate to the original sentences imposed and cause disparities in
punishment that conflict with Congress’s reasoning for imposing a determinate
sentencing regime; and (4) disparities will continue to exist until case-specific actors
at sentencing are allowed to consider the impact of “forbidden” factors on rates of
incarceration.
I.

CONSIDERATIONS AT SENTENCING
A.

Rejecting Rehabilitation at Sentencing

Throughout the 1950s and ‘60s, the rehabilitative ideal and its indeterminate
model of sentencing dominated United States criminal justice theory and practice,16
but rehabilitation started to lose favor among both the political left and right in the
1970s with concerns about disparate sentencing and the overall ineffectiveness of
rehabilitating a person in an incarceration setting.17 The 1980s ended the era of
indeterminate sentencing with the SRA’s creation of the Sentencing Commission and
the—now advisory 18—Sentencing Guidelines.19 The Act requires the Commission to
ensure, when making the Guidelines, that a prison sentence is inappropriate “for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” 20
It also abolishes parole in favor of a focus on “truth in sentencing.”21
Congress passed an act in 1987 that clarified the extent to which federal trial
judges could rely on rehabilitation when crafting sentences of imprisonment.22 In
16
17
18

19
20
21

22

See Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal 3–20 (1981), in NORA V. DEMLEITNER.
DOUGLAS A. BERMAN, MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 147 (3d ed.
2013).
Id. at 147; Martin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1973), in DEMLEITNER ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 142–43.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004) (holding that every factual finding necessary to
increase a criminal defendant’s Guidelines sentence needs to be found beyond a reasonable doubt by
the trier of fact, and holding that the remedy for such a violation is advisory—rather than binding—
Guidelines).
28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining the
scope of the Commission’s authority pursuant to § 994).
28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2012).
FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 1, 11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING]. Truth in sentencing refers to policies, like the abolishment of
parole, that eliminate disparities between court-ordered sentences and the time actually served.
Katherine J. Rosich & Kamala Mallik Kane, Truth in Sentencing and State Sentencing Practices, 252
NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 18, 18 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000252e.pdf. The truth in
sentencing goals of the 1980s brought changes to mandatory minimum penalties as well, with an
increase in the number and severity of mandatory minimums for drug offenses and offenses committed
with a firearm. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT, supra note 10, at 23. Congress justified the changes
with appeals to sentencing uniformity. Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012) (“The court . . . shall . . . recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate
means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”).
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Tapia v. United States,23 the Supreme Court interpreted this statute according to the
text’s plain meaning, holding that “imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of
promoting . . . rehabilitation.”24 Tapia determined that Congress’s message to trial
judges since the enactment of the SRA has been to not consider prison as the source
of a defendant’s rehabilitation.25 The Tapia decision officially marked the end of
sentencing decisions based solely on rehabilitating convicted defendants. 26
Without authority to rely on the rehabilitative model, case-specific actors at
sentencing cannot consider the would-be rehabilitative—and, conversely,
deleterious—effects of prisons on convicted transgender defendants. Regardless of
the impact of implicit judicial bias or anchoring effects that incentivize sentences of
incarceration over alternatives, trial judges do not even have the authority to refuse
to send a transgender person to prison on the basis that all prisons are unsafe for
transgender people (and that thus none will work to rehabilitate them). Even with
vast prosecutorial discretion in the wake of determinate sentencing,27 prosecutors
still ordinarily have to bring charges that reflect “the most serious offense that is
consistent with the nature of the defendant’s conduct, and that is likely to result in a
sustainable conviction” 28 regardless of whether the subsequent punishment will
actually reflect the severity of the crime. 29
Upon reentry to society, trans ex-prisoners are not only stacked with debts to
the criminal justice system,30 but they also have such devastating physical and
mental health problems exacerbated by their experiences in prison 31 that it is
inevitable that at least some will participate in criminalized economies as a form of
income and/or coping.32 High police surveillance of low-income communities33 almost

23
24
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32

33

564 U.S. 319 (2011).
Id. at 327.
Id. at 329–30 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)).
Id. at 332 (“Congress did not intend that courts consider offenders’ rehabilitative needs when imposing
prison sentences.”).
See James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity:
Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 302 (1999) (“Reduced
discretion for judges at the end of the process magnifies the importance of decisions made by the
prosecutor, probation office, and law enforcement officials.”).
Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013).
For the common types of crimes committed by vulnerable transgender populations, see infra Part III,
Section C.
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 154–57 (rev. ed., 2011).
Long-term physical and mental health problems can result from long-term solitary confinement and
interference with hormone replacement therapies. See infra Part III.
See JAIME M. GRANT, LISA A. MOTTET & JUSTIN TANIS, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 3 (2011) (“16% [of participants in the survey] said they
had been compelled to work in the underground economy for income (such as doing sex work or selling
drugs).”).
See, e.g., Lori A. Saffin, Identities Under Siege: Violence Against Trans Persons of Color, in CAPTIVE
GENDERS, supra note 3, at 150–52 (explaining that the economic need to survive drives low-income
trans folks to criminalized ways of making an income that subject them to constant police surveillance);
DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE 120 (2011) (discussing how the War on Drugs in the 1980s gave law
enforcement more tools to increase policing in poor communities and communities of color).
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guarantees high rates of recidivism.34 If sentencing actors had more discretion to
consider rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment, then it would be possible to vary
(even depart downward one hundred percent35) from the Guidelines ranges for
populations of defendants particularly vulnerable to incarceration cycles.36
Regardless of how probable one hundred percent downward departures would be on
these grounds, the current sentencing regime makes them impossible.37
Rehabilitation concerns are the most pressing for trans people38 and inmates
in solitary, as the quality of life in confinement correlates with effective society reintegration.39 The fact that trans people tend to be automatically placed in
administrative segregation (SEG)40 makes these concerns even more important. If
the focus were on effective society reintegration and preventing recidivism, more
emphasis would be placed on providing relevant health care and safe housing for
trans people in prisons.41
The problem with rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment is that trial judges
are given so much discretion to consider any and every detail about a person’s life
that they can drastically over-sentence based on biases and other subjective
judgments about morality.42 The fear is that the sentence a person receives depends
solely on the judge that person gets, since each judge comes with different moral
codes.43 The result is a disparity in sentencing, with alike defendants treated
34

35
36
37
38
39

40
41
42

43

See, e.g., SPADE, supra note 33, at 121–22 (explaining that the probability of arrest for people of color
and poor folks is higher due to high levels of police surveillance, regardless of individual decisions to
comply with or disregard legal norms, since criminalized behaviors are just as common in other places
but surveillance rates are not); Alina Ball, Comment, An Imperative Redefinition of “Community”:
Incorporating Reentry Lawyers to Increase the Efficacy of Community Economic Development
Initiatives, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1883, 1904 (2008) (“In a criminal justice system where a significant
portion of recidivism is attributed to technical or administrative parole violations, the increased parolee
supervision and police surveillance may accelerate the rate of recidivism.”).
The suggestion here is that trial judges should refuse to impose a term of incarceration in favor of
alternatives to cages.
The likelihood of departures on these grounds will not be high without pressures on Congress to
abandon “tough on crime” sentencing and on federal judges to pursue alternatives to incarceration over
traditional prison sentences.
As it currently stands, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 gives judges limited authority to sentence below the statutory
minimum only in cases where the prosecution has moved for a downward departure for “substantial
assistance.” § 3553(e) (2012).
Colopy, supra note 6, at 270.
See Bernice B. Donald, Rethinking Solitary Confinement, 31 CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2016) (questioning
whether confinement conditions will increase or decrease chances of living productive and healthy
lives); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 329
(2006) (discussing how confinement significantly impaired the inmates’ capacity to successfully adapt
to society).
See Hagner, supra note 2, at 849.
Colopy, supra note 6, at 270.
See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (holding that a New York trial judge’s
imposition of a sentence of death for being a “menace to society” was acceptable because New York’s
indeterminate sentencing regime’s focus on rehabilitation allowed for wide judicial discretion to find
mitigating or aggravating factors). This decision effectively allowed trial judges under indeterminate
sentencing regimes to use logic about rehabilitation to justify death sentences.
See FRANKEL, supra note 17; Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 7–8
(1972) (highlighting the concerns that too much judicial discretion produces disparities in sentencing
based off of “variegated passions and prejudices”).
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unalike.44 Using rehabilitation could backfire and cause even more trans people to be
sent to prison on the basis that biased, transphobic judges think that trans people
are morally disgusting.
But there are Constitutional protections in place to prevent capital sentences
for crimes like burglary or rape. 45 If Congress and trial judges had pressures to push
for alternatives to incarceration, giving trial judges somewhat limited discretion to
depart downward (rather than depart upward for “moral” reasons) would eliminate
concerns about over-sentencing on the basis of transphobic bias. Providing at least
some discretion to focus on rehabilitation also helps prevent the imposition of
unwarranted uniformities (treating unalike defendants alike).46 In oddball cases that
Congress never would have expected or predicted, trial judges should not have to keep
their hands tied: they should be able to consider factors that make defendants
different and whose sentences should not be the exact same. Trans people are those
defendants, since the deleterious effects of prison on trans people add up to punish
trans inmates more than their cis counterparts. 47
Case-specific actors should have to fashion a sentence with full knowledge that
any term of incarceration for trans people will likely lead to at least some—or even
the entire—time spent in solitary or max, resulting in devastating mental health
effects noted in Part III. Because of Congress’s obsession with uniformity since the
1980s, these concerns—no matter how important—cannot be the sole reasons for a
downward departure. Cycles of incentivized criminalized behaviors and further
incarceration are bound to perpetuate themselves without intervention.
B.

The Current Federal Sentencing Scheme Eschews Considerations of
Gender Identity at Sentencing

Gender, like race or socioeconomic status, is one of many “irrelevant” factors
that many current criminal justice theorists believe should not be considered at
sentencing.48 Congress directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the SRA to make
sure that certain personal characteristics would never be used by themselves in

44
45
46

47
48

See Frankel, supra note 43, at 7–8.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253–57 (1972) (holding the discretionary death penalty statutes
unconstitutional in their application).
See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV 21, 60–61 (2000) (“[S]entencing under the
Guidelines produced unwarranted uniformity as offenders of differing culpability were given similar
sentences.”).
See infra Part III, B.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) [hereinafter
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL]; see also Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and
Sentencing, 22 CRIME & JUST. 201, 205 (1997) (“In every jurisdiction that changed its sentencing policies
and attempted to establish sentencing guidelines, three propositions were taken as self-evident. First,
race and gender were believed to be illegitimate considerations in sentencing. . . . [I]f race was a
forbidden consideration, so self-evidently was gender.”).
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sentencing decisions.49 The Act also made sure that the Commission issued policy
statements around the relevancy of certain defendant characteristics in judicial
decisions to depart from the Guidelines.50 Taking out almost all human
characteristics of a person as “irrelevant” in most circumstances, Congress has
directed the Sentencing Commission—in an effort to promote uniformity and reduce
sentencing disparities—to gut individualized sentencing. The result of this push to
end disparate sentencing has actually increased the severity of overall sentences by
imposing harsh uniformities across the board.51
The Act still gives the sentencing court discretion to consider the “history and
characteristics” of the defendant in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).52 But with very few defendant
characteristics left to consider explicitly, “history and characteristics” have come to
signify judicial consideration of criminal history categories, 53 career criminal offender
guidelines,54 and downward departures for defendant cooperation with the
government and participation in the investigation as an informant.55 None of these
categories are accurate measures of a person’s unique life experience.56
In practice, § 3553(a) does not give trial judges excessive discretion 57 to
consider defendant characteristics when Congress has directed the Sentencing
Commission to seriously downplay the appropriateness of most. Devaluing unique
life situations as “not ordinarily relevant” at sentencing makes it difficult to
empathize with the defendants. It becomes harder to understand the basic human
incentives behind criminalized behaviors, especially crimes without victims, nonviolent or low-level offenses associated with poverty and participation in informal

49
50

51
52
53
54
55
56
57

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 48, at §5H1 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)) (“[T]he
Act directs the Commission to ensure that the guidelines and policy statements ‘are entirely neutral’ as
to five characteristics—race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status.”).
See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), (e)) (discussing the Commission’s task to determine whether eleven
“specific offender characteristics” are relevant, and noting that five of those factors—education, skills,
employment, family responsibilities, and community ties—are discouraged by the SRA as generally
inappropriate to consider).
See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 93 (2010) (“What many hoped
would be a compromise resulting in uniform and moderate sentences instead led to uniformly harsh
sentences.”).
See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 48, at §5H1 (2016) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) (“[T]he
Act also directs the sentencing court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, to consider,
among other factors, ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant.’”).
See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(10)) (discussing the importance of considering criminal history
categories).
See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(11)) (discussing the importance of considering career criminality).
These are only triggered if the prosecutor moves for a downward departure for“acceptance of
responsibility” or “substantial assistance.” See id. at §§ 3E1.1, 5K1.1.
Selective policing in vulnerable neighborhoods and the lack of opportunity to make incomes in
mainstream markets produce defendants’ visible criminal histories. See generally ALEXANDER, supra
note 30; SPADE, supra note 33.
Although § 3553(a) has more authority than advisory policies, the Seventh Circuit in U.S. v. Hurlburt
allowed for a vagueness challenge, implying that the Guidelines are laws susceptible to Constitutional
challenges. 835 F.3d 715, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
accepted certiorari on this issue in an Eleventh Circuit case, Beckles v. United States, 616 Fed. Appx.
415 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2510.
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markets, and financial offenses in response to the high costs of becoming one’s
authentic self.
Even if trial judges could explicitly consider gender at sentencing, the
Guidelines calculations themselves have anchoring effects on trial judges that still
result in punishments (usually prison sentences) tethered to the Guidelines ranges.58
The Supreme Court has noted that the post-Booker three-step sentencing process was
designed to produce an anchoring effect in order to “achieve uniformity” in sentencing
decisions.59 A trial judge’s first step is to determine the applicable Guidelines range.60
This step anchors the trial judge who uses this initial determination to make
subsequent decisions about the sentence. 61 Just looking at suggested Guidelines
ranges, which are usually terms of incarceration, will influence a trial judge to decide
to send a trans person to prison rather than suggest an alternative. Even with
discretion to vary from advisory Guidelines, the Guidelines’ anchoring effect
influences trial judges to sentence trans people at or near the suggested incarceration
ranges.
Trial judges have no incentives to make better—alternative—punishments for
transgender defendants. After the sentencing hearing, trial judges relinquish any
control of the defendant’s fate over to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or federally
contracted private corrections corporations.62 Because they do not control what
happens once the defendant takes one step outside of the courtroom door, trial judges
need not consider the devastating impact of prisons on trans people. There is a legal
history, both from Congress and the federal courts, to leave formal control over
inmate housing and placement decisions up to correctional discretion.63 Trial judges
are never expected to be accountable for any rights violations that happen to trans
prisoners because that responsibility is left up to the BOP or private corrections
58

59
60
61
62

63

The “anchoring effect” is a psychological heuristic, usually involving numbers, where a person’s
decision-making process is undermined by reliance on information presented earlier, the anchor. See
Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, Anchoring Effects: Evidence from Art, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1027, 1027
(2009) (explaining experiments in which subjects are given a random number who then show a bias in
their final numerical estimates toward the number they originally saw). This effect is pronounced in
sentencing. E.g., Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases
in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2014) (arguing that the length and severity of sentences has not changed since
Booker’s shift back to discretionary sentencing because trial judges are subconsciously anchored to the
Guidelines ranges).
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 542 (2013) (“[T]he post-Booker federal sentencing scheme . . .
aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines.”).
Bennett, supra note 58, at 518 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007)).
See id. at 523–29.
See Yvette K.W. Bourcicot & Daniel Hirotsu Woofter, Prudent Policy: Accommodating Prisoners with
Gender Dysphoria, 12 STAN J.C.R. & C.L. 283, 317 (2016) (quoting McLamore v. State, 186 S.E.2d 250,
255 (S.C. 1972)) (“There is a longstanding policy of the courts not to interfere in prison administration
and discipline at any level.”).
See 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(c) (2016) (giving corrections facilities discretion to place trans inmates in gendersegregated housing units); Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 62, at 319 (“[C]ourts’ general deference to
prisons is even more expansive for housing classification decisions regarding pre-operative transsexual
inmates whose gender identities are not legally recognized.”); see also MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at
106 (“Prison officials have virtually unbridled discretion over placement decisions.”).
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corporation, so there is no reason for trial judges to even think about defendants’
future safety. This allows trial judges to cop out of considering a trans person’s high
statistical probability of experiencing violence and isolation in prison.64
II.

DISCRETION IN THE HANDS OF CORRECTIONS FACILITIES

With unused judicial discretion to determine housing placement comes the
implicit grant of that discretion to corrections. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of
2003 (PREA)65 gives the BOP and federally contracted private corrections facilities
the discretion to make several case-by-case analyses on what procedures to follow
with housing and protections for transgender inmates.66 Even before PREA, courts
consistently deferred to corrections’ discretionary administrative decisions about how
to keep things running.67
A.

Male or Female?

To determine housing placement for transgender inmates, a trans person’s
“gender” (sex68) must be determined. It has been both the practice of federal prison
authorities and trial judges in civil court to determine a person’s sex through reliance
on whether a person has undergone sex-reassignment69 surgery.70 Although the test
is the same in civil court, in criminal proceedings the sexual declaratory hearing
differs because the judge relies on the presentencing report from processing.71 The
judge therefore defers to decisions made by other officers in corrections departments
to determine something—a trans person’s sex—that will be the basis for another
discretionary, case-by-case decision by corrections administrators72—where that

64

65
66
67
68

69
70
71
72

The argument goes as follows: Because it is impossible to know what any given corrections facility will
choose for its transgender inmates and how each will individually handle cases of violence, it is
inappropriate to use the mere possibility of rights violations as a justification for altering downward a
trans person’s sentence. It would introduce sentencing disparities because transgender people will
automatically get shorter sentences just because they are transgender. This Note argues, however, that
this is the only necessary way to reduce the disparate punishments transgender inmates receive in
comparison to cisgender inmates.
34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30309 (2012).
28 C.F.R. §§ 115.41–.43 (2017).
Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 62, at 317.
I distinguish between the words “sex” and “gender” in this Note. Sex is the socio-scientific construct of
supposed biological “male” and “female” bodies (despite vast variations in 1–2% of the population with
less binary features, see generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY 53 (2000)), while gender is
the cultural coercively-assigned-at-birth construct of the (usually racialized) norms that “men” and
“women” are supposed to play.
Sex-reassignment surgery (SRS) is used to denote that a trans person has altered his/her/their genital
configuration. The availabilities and even possibilities of these surgeries vary widely across the nation,
with different techniques espoused by a small number of doctors that perform these procedures.
Tedeschi, supra note 6, at 32–36.
See Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 520.
28 C.F.R. § 115.42(c) (2017).
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trans person will be housed. This circular double deference to corrections results in
unbridled discretion to place trans inmates literally wherever. 73
With the “test” of sex depending upon invasive surgical procedures on genitalia
that many trans people either cannot afford or do not want, 74 many trans prisoners
are sent to facilities that do not match their lived, full-time gender.75 Many scholars
have criticized the use of current genital configuration as the determinative factor of
housing placement,76 mostly because it leads to violence, isolation, and detrimental
outcomes. PREA, however, gives corrections administrators complete discretion over
decisions to place trans people in men’s or women’s wards “on a case-by-case basis.”77
The pressure to change from a “genitalia” test to a gender identity test, however, will
not come without challenges from conservatives who rely on transphobic and
homophobic stereotypes of trans people, especially trans women, as predatory. 78
The argument for keeping the housing determinations based on genital
configuration is threefold. First, corrections facilities do not want to make cisgender
women feel uncomfortable or “unsafe” with the presence of trans women in their
cells.79 This assumes that trans women are deceptive and dangerous,80 and plays on

73
74

75

76
77
78

79
80

MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 106.
Julia C. Oparah, Feminism and the (Trans)Gender Entrapment of Gender Nonconforming Prisoners, 18
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 239, 261 (2012) (“Since many transsexuals do not chose [sic] or cannot afford
‘bottom surgery,’ prisoners who may have had hormone treatment and ‘top surgery’ (to remove or
construct breasts) will be assigned to an institution according to a gender assignation based on one part
of their body, that does not comport with their physical and emotional experience.”).
See e.g., VICTORIA LAW, RESISTANCE BEHIND BARS: THE STRUGGLES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN 206 (2d ed.
2012) (“The transgender women were housed with the men. ‘They will not house them with us [cis
women] because, although some have breasts and live as women, they have not had full surgical
change of genitals.’”) (quoting RJ); Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 522 (“An inmate with a penis is
considered male; one with a vagina is considered female. It doesn’t matter whether nature or a surgeon
provided the part.”) (quoting Brockenbrough); Tedeschi, supra note 6, at 34 (“[I]t is the ‘practice of
federal prison authorities . . . to incarcerate persons who have completed sexual reassignment with
prisoners of the transsexual’s new gender, but to incarcerate persons who have not completed it with
prisoners of the transsexual’s original gender.’”) (quoting Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir.
1993)).
See, e.g., LAW, supra note 75, at 202; Oparah, supra note 74, at 261; Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 522–
24; Nikko Harada, Comment, Trans-Literacy Within Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: De/Fusing
Gender and Sex, 36 N.M.L. REV. 627, 646 (2006).
28 C.F.R. § 115.42(c) (2017).
See Harada, supra note 76, at 646; see also Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 62, at 319; Faithful, supra
note 1, at 4 (“Lower court decisions have variably affirmed transgender prisoners’ rights to safer living
conditions, but no ruling has definitively objected to the administrative status quo that allows and even
promotes genitalia-based classification.”).
See Harada, supra note 76, at 646.
Compare Janice G. Raymond, Sappho by Surgery, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 131 (Susan
Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006) (claiming that all trans women are deceptive schemers who have
“colonized” lesbian feminism and whose purpose is to appropriate the female body by raping cisgender
women), with Sandy Stone The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto, in THE
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 221 (Stryker & Whittle, eds., 2006) (undermining the biologically
deterministic assumptions that serve as the foundation for Raymond’s argument and proposing new
forms of self-expression for trans people that transcend these narrow conceptualizations of the body
and identity vulnerable to transphobic rhetoric of deception).
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antiquated and patriarchal notions of protecting sacred and pure (white) femininity.81
Second, corrections facilities speculate that trans women will be violent toward
cisgender women,82 which also plays into the notion that trans women are somehow
inherently dangerous. Third, corrections facilities fear that mixing trans women with
cis women in the general population will result in sexual activity. 83
These arguments tend to dominate conversation about gendered prison
facilities for a few more specific reasons. First, fearing “sex” between inmates is code
for sexual assault,84 which again assumes that all trans women are dangerous and
predatory. It not only ignores the historical prevalence of sexual activity between
women in corrections facilities,85 but it also deliberately ignores the plight of trans
women who constantly experience sexual assault in men’s prisons. 86 Second, these
arguments actually justify the amount of torture and assault trans women go through
in men’s prisons, since—the argument goes—at least now the cis women are safe.
Again, the reasoning behind this argument comes from the underlying assumption
that cis women will be targeted and assaulted by trans women, stereotypically seen
as dangerous and predatory, if both are housed together.87
Third, the possibility of reproductive sexual intercourse in women’s prisons, by
way of sex acts between women with differing sets of genitalia, is alarming to prison
administrators.88 The mere idea of procreative sex, pregnancies, and births in prison
is controversial in a mainstream society that still debates over the right to
contraceptives and abortions.89 The mainstream American public could not handle
the idea of keeping people locked away together in crowded cages if those people had
81

82
83
84
85
86
87

88
89

See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
1, 8 (1993) (discussing the historical context behind the purity of white women’s reproductive capacities
in that white women were coerced into reproducing the master class and Black women were coerced
into reproducing the slave class); Anti-Racist Collective, White Supremacy and Protecting White
Women, ST. LOUIS AM., July 10, 2015, at A9 (tracing the history of justifying violence against
indigenous nations and slaves by demonizing Black and Brown men as sexual threats to white women’s
“purity”).
Harada, supra note 76, at 646.
Id.
See REGINA KUNZEL, CRIMINAL INTIMACY: PRISON AND THE UNEVEN HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN
SEXUALITY 153 (2008) (“[R]ape would come to be understood as the defining practice of sex in men’s
prisons.”).
See id. at 101, 113 (explaining the historical shifts in the way people viewed sexual relationships in
women’s prisons starting from the 1940s).
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 107 (“[F]ramed as sexually degraded, transgender women are considered
inviolable, thereby negating the concern for their safety in men’s institutions.”).
See Olivia Broustra, Dear Trans Women (Trans Identified Males), MEDIUM (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://medium.com/@oliviabroustra/dear-trans-women-trans-identified-males-5d62e0f2ce57
(“[B]ecause a trans woman murderer and rapist was raped in a male prison, [cis women inmates] will
now be put at risk of harm from this violent offender.”); see also Raymond, supra note 80, at 132–34
(reducing all transgender women to predators whose inherent “masculinity” infects and “rapes”
women’s spaces).
See Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 532; Harada, supra note 76, at 646.
See, e.g., Robert Pear, Rebecca R. Ruiz, & Laurie Goodstein, Trump Administration Rolls Back Birth
Control Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trumpcontraception-birth-control.html; Somini Sengupta, Trump Revives Ban on Foreign Aid to Groups that
Give Abortion Counseling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/world/trump-ban-foreign-aid-abortions.html.
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the opportunity to be highly sexually active—which most prisoners do, despite
mainstream thoughts of prison as sex-free as a form of punishment or in order to
repent for one’s sins90—and the ability to reproduce generations after generations of
“criminals.”91
The paternalistic notion of protecting cisgender women from the possibility of
getting “knocked up” in prison can thus become the dominant conversation that
justifies prison facility segregation by genitalia, all the while ignoring actual coerced
sex acts in men’s prison facilities that oftentimes result in the spread of sexually
transmitted infections.92 This fear of sexuality between prisoners does not hold when
administrators ignore the fact that cis women can become pregnant from reproductive
sex acts, consensual or otherwise, with male guards.93 By this logic, forcing trans
women to be housed with and raped by cisgender men (the effects of which can remain
invisible and disinteresting to the majority of the public) is not a problem as long as
there is somewhat less of a chance that cis women could get pregnant in prison, take
the (eventually very visible) information to the press, and make state, local, or even
national news headlines.
Giving corrections administrators discretion at sex-segregated housing
placements arguably advances proportionality goals by allowing for individualized
analyses in ambiguous cases, but it still causes disparities in punishment. Unlike
cisgender people, trans people are most likely to be placed in sex-segregated facilities
that do not match their identities, which can result in serious physical and emotional
harms noted in Part III. Additionally, trans people across different jurisdictions and
geographical areas will be housed—and thus treated—differently from one another
depending on varying levels of transphobia in predominantly conservative or
progressive locations. While proportionality goals can be important at sentencing,94
at housing placement hearings they produce vast disparities in treatment. Trial
judges should make these individualized assessments because they are much more
visible95 and much less partisan than administrators behind corrections facilities.

90
91
92

93
94

95

KUNZEL, supra note 84, at 15, 98.
See, e.g., Philip Jenkins, Eugenics, Crime, and Ideology: The Case of Progressive Pennsylvania, 51 PA.
HIST. 64, 65–67 (1984) (tracing the historical evolution of the eugenicist arguments linking criminality
with hereditary “defective mental states”).
See Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 523, 532 (noting that “sexual activity” between trans women and cis
women may hinder gender affirming housing placement while also warning a few pages earlier about
the “mortal dangers” of rape and violence from genitalia-based placement); see also MOGUL ET AL., supra
note 6, at 100, 103, 107.
See LAW, supra note 75, at 60 (“Sexual aggression and abuse by male prison staff is a far greater
problem than most are willing to admit.”).
Proponents for individualized sentencing—many of whom no longer dominate sentencing theory—
believe that indeterminate sentencing is important for trial judges to make unique sentences for
individual cases. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (“[E]very convicted person [is] an
individual and every case [is] a unique study in human failings.”); see also Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (holding that trial judges may use evidence at sentencing—unallowable at trial—
to garner information needed to make sentencing decisions).
With appointment and lifetime tenure, federal trial judges may not be able to be held as accountable as
elected state judges.
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General Population or SEG?

To determine whether a trans person should be housed in an administrative
segregation unit, corrections facilities must comply with PREA’s regulations on
protected custody.96 In general, inmates at risk of victimization should not be placed
in SEG against their will unless “there is no available alternative means of separation
from likely abusers.”97 Trans people should also not be placed in a specified “trans”
wing against their will unless it is for their own protection.98 These exceptions carve
out spaces for corrections administrators to exercise discretion in ways that
disproportionately segregate trans prisoners.99 This is because corrections facilities
have substantially over-relied on placing trans inmates in SEG as the only way to
protect them from rape and violence in the general population.100
Corrections institutions have so much discretion in housing decisions that
PREA’s protective custody protections are toothless. First, corrections administrators
can easily justify—and continue to justify at every review period—placement in SEG
if there are “no available alternatives” for someone so vulnerable to violence in the
general population.101 One trans woman, for instance, recounts her story about being
placed in an all-male “safe prison” unit designed to house those needing “safe
keeping.”102 While the unit was designed to comply with PREA, trans women with
visible secondary sex characteristics were placed in cells with (usually sexually
aggressive) cisgender male inmates who continuously sexually assaulted them.103
Compliance with PREA is too easy, and it incentivizes prioritizing institutional safety
(litigation avoidance) over individual safety.
Second, PREA does not give adequate protections to trans inmates who still
lose privileges, like recreational time and basic human socialization, available to
those in the general prison population. 104 Administrative segregation is still just that,

96
97
98
99

100

101
102
103
104

28 C.F.R. §§ 115.42(g), .43(a).
28 C.F.R. § 115.43(a).
28 C.F.R. § 115.42(g).
Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 62, at 320–21 (“Prison officials generally have a large degree of
discretion to make final segregation decisions . . . . This in turn may lead to segregation for unlawful or
abusive purposes.”); see also MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108 (noting that trans people are oftentimes
automatically placed in segregated units or medical wings against their will but “for their own safety”).
Hagner, supra note 2, at 849; see also Lamble, supra note 6, at 244; Faithful, supra note 1, at 5 (noting
that many prisons use solitary as an alternative placement for trans prisoners as “the best available
solution”); Harada, supra note 76, at 646 (noting that several scholars have proposed administrative
segregation as a solution).
See 28 C.F.R. § 115.43(a), (c), (d), (e); see also Colopy, supra note 6, at 268–69 (“[A]n official’s
constitutional duty to provide security to all inmates may override a single inmate’s constitutional
rights.”).
Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 213.
Id. This is known as V-coding and will be discussed in more detail in Part III.
See MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108 (noting deprivation from human interaction, communal
activities, and recreation time); Colopy, supra note 6, at 268 (noting denied socialization and outdoor
activities); Faithful, supra note 1, at 5.
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segregation. SEG is a disciplinary tool105 designed to further punish inmates who
violate prison rules by separating them from others and isolating them in a tiny cell
with sometimes less than one hour of time outside of the cell per day.106 Segregation
oftentimes fails to truly protect even those who request it because correctional officers
(COs) treat segregated prisoners more harshly, both because of the presumption that
SEG prisoners are more dangerous and because there are fewer witnesses to hold
COs accountable.107 Using SEG for prisoners who need protections expands a system
of punishment within the prison to those who have experienced, or are particularly
vulnerable to, violence.108
Third, while PREA specifically calls for the continuation of programs and
services to inmates in SEG for protection,109 many trans people in protective custody
are still denied access to educational and vocational programs, work opportunities,
and the opportunity to gain “good time credits” or qualifications for prerelease
programs.110 The lack of opportunities to participate in these programs cannot be
considered at sentencing, however, because trial judges cannot solely consider
rehabilitation concerns.111 It is once again at sentencing where the federal criminal
justice system fails trans people, as statutorily demanded judicial deference to
corrections administrators continues to result in the violence and subjugation of
transgender prisoners.
III.

EFFECTS

The effects of prisons on trans people are devastating. Not only do many have
the false choice—if given one—between physical violence or extreme isolation, but
many also have to cope with being strategically denied gender-affirming care and
even punished for consensual same-sex sex acts. These disparate punishments
contribute to high recidivism rates and getting lost in a cycle of never-ending
incarceration and criminal justice supervision upon release.

105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See Lamble, supra note 6, at 244 (“Even when used for safety purposes, ‘protective custody’ constitutes
a form of punishment . . . .”); see also MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108 (“[S]egregation units [are]
purportedly designed to punish individuals who violate the rules . . . .”).
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108; Grassian, supra note 39, at 246.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108.
See Colopy, supra note 6, at 268 (“Placing transsexual inmates in administrative segregation because of
their transsexual status and not for any misconduct, even if it is for their protection, effectively
punishes them for being transsexual.”).
28 C.F.R. § 115.43(b).
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108; Faithful, supra note 1, at 5; Hagner, supra note 2, at 849.
Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 327 (2011); see also supra notes 16–47 and accompanying text.
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The “Choice” Between Violence and Isolation

PREA has failed to eliminate the false choice between violence in the general
population and isolation (and oftentimes even further violence112) in solitary
confinement.113
i.

Physical Violence and Retaliation

Trans people, especially trans women in men’s prison facilities, are most likely
to experience physical violence and sexual assault while incarcerated.114 This is true
not just for horizontal violence between prisoners but also vertical violence among
trans inmates and corrections staff.115 Even in the two-to-three year mark after PREA
was passed, one in five AMAB and one in four AFAB folks still faced sexual assault
in U.S. prisons.116 While transgender people only comprise 0.6 percent of the current
U.S. population,117 up to five percent of trans women in U.S. prison facilities in 2005
had experienced sexual assault.118
Even PREA-compliant prison facilities can continue to use sexual violence as a
management tool.119 Correctional officers function as gatekeepers to sexual activity,
selectively choosing which sexual activity to write up and which to overlook.120 One
common tactic among men’s prison facilities is “V-coding,” or placing transgender
women in cells with aggressive cisgender male inmates as a form of social control.121
V-coding is so common that it has become “a central part of a transwoman’s
112
113
114
115

116
117
118
119
120
121

See LAW, supra note 75, at 204 (“[Being] in solitary confinement . . . makes people more vulnerable to
staff sexual abuse and other misconduct.”); MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108 (“Most disturbingly, such
placement can increase, rather than decrease, the risk of violence to LGBT people in prisons.”).
See MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108 (noting the “catch-22” trans prisoners must face); see also
Faithful, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing how little PREA and discretionary policies have improved the
lives of trans prisoners “whose needs remain deeply misunderstood”).
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 100; Oparah, supra note 74, at 262; Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 522–24;
Colopy, supra note 6, at 268; Hagner, supra note 2, at 849.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 102 (“[P]risoners also must often submit to nonconsensual sex acts with
guards or with other inmates for safety, to be free from disciplinary punishment or further harassment,
or in return for drugs, commissary items, or other survival needs.”); see also Blake Nemec, No One
Enters Like Them: Health, Gender Variance, and the PIC, in CAPTIVE GENDERS, supra note 3, at 222
(“We’ve had so many transgenders [sic] that have been raped [by COs] and had proof. One of them even
had the towel the CO wiped his semen on. Today I haven’t heard of one case that a transgender won
against a law officer.”) (quoting Kim Love); Candi Raine Sweet, Being an Incarcerated Transperson:
Shouldn’t People Care?, in CAPTIVE GENDERS, supra note 3, at 185–86 (“I have been cut by other
prisoners for refusing to perform sexual acts for them, and I have been beaten and sexually assaulted
(sodomized with the nightstick) by correctional staff.”).
Lamble, supra note 6, at 242.
Jan Hoffman, Estimate of U.S. Transgender Population Doubles to 1.4 Million Adults, N.Y. TIMES (June
30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/health/transgender-population.html?_r=0.
See STOP PRISONER RAPE, IN THE SHADOWS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN U.S. DETENTION FACILITIES 5 (2006),
http://justdetention.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/In-The-Shadows-Sexual-Violence-in-U.S.Detention-Facilities.pdf.
See Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 212–13; see also Oparah, supra note 74, at 262.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 100; Oparah, supra note 74, at 262.
LAW, supra note 75, at 203; see also Nemec, supra note 115, at 222 (“The COs use the transgendered
prisoners to keep the violence rate down. . . . They use us.”) (quoting Kim Love).
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sentence.” 122 The stories are all the same. Alexis Giraldo, for instance, was housed
with a cisgender male prisoner who had status as an employee. The employee, and
eventually one of his friends, requested she live with them. They then started raping
her daily. Despite her several requests, she was never moved to a different cell.123
Sexual violence in prison occurs within an environment that encourages
objectifying and dehumanizing transfeminine bodies—especially trans women of
color—through mandatory strip searches by male staff.124 Strip searches tend to be
“excessive, abusive, and invasive” and overtly transphobic, creating “highly
sexualized and excessively hostile” prison environments. 125 They involve male COs
groping “breasts, buttocks, or genitalia” and leering during shower, changing, and
restroom times.126 Orders to strip and then show off body parts, masturbate, or dance
for COs are not unheard-of.127 Trans bodies are often put on display for not just the
COs but also the rest of the prison population who gawk, jeer, and shout obscenities
at them.128 Some scholars have suggested that strip-searching itself is not just an act
of institutional violence but “a precursor to sexual assault.” 129 It does not take much
to go from shouting sexual desires to making sexual advances, especially when the
people who just stripped will soon share a cell with those men.
Trans prisoners oftentimes cannot escape violence even in administrative
segregation. Traci Greene, for example, was placed in protective custody for her
“feminine appearance” but was still attacked by another inmate with a mop handle
and fifty pound fire extinguisher. 130 Placing victims of assault in SEG “often burdens
the victims more than the aggressors” 131 and fails to protect them from attacks by
COs.132 When COs assault trans inmates, they can get away with it because of the
power differentials between prison guards and prisoners. 133 The ultimate irony of
protective custody for trans prisoners is that those tasked with protecting them can
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

129
130
131
132
133

Nemec, supra note 115, at 228–9 (explaining how it is a prison norm and form of currency for goods and
services).
Oparah, supra note 74, at 262.
Id. at 264. (“[F]ascination with the transgender body combines with racialized sexual exotification to
further objectify transgender women of color.”).
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 101 (quoting Human Rights Watch).
Id.
Id.
See Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 211–12 (“I was put in a caged area where over 200 men witnessed,
gawked, and made fun of me. Some made passes, some made lewd comments, and others made known
their desire to have sex with me. . . . Then I was forced to strip off my clothes, bra, panties and stand
nude in front of them while I changed clothes. This generated a lot of ‘cat calls,’ whistles, and more
lewd comments.”).
Oparah, supra note 74, at 263–64.
Harada, supra note 76, at 637.
Id. at 646, n.197.
See, e.g., LAW, supra note 75, at 204; MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 102; Nemec, supra note 115, at 222;
Sweet, supra note 115, at 185–86.
See Sweet, supra note 115, at 186 (“These very same prison staff do not even get punished for their
violating actions. . . . If anything, the most that happens to employees is a suspension for a period of
time, but that’s about it. Like nothing ever took place, like the world stopped as they hurt someone,
they don’t face charges for their acts—they don’t even get fired, but they are simply let back to work,
bragging about what they’ve done and[/]or how they did it, they sometimes even taunt the person
harmed with other fellow employees.”).
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still harm them.134 SEG is a disciplinary tool designed more for punishment than for
protection.
Prison policies and PREA still fail to adequately protect trans prisoners from
violence,135 and they cause even more punishment for those who engage in same-sex
sexual acts. First, prisoners are punished for consensual sexual relationships among
one another.136 Since the passage of PREA, write-ups have increased in women’s
prisons that punish any physical contact as sexual misconduct. 137 The write-ups
ultimately affect prisoners’ ability to get good time credits, and some can result in
charges for sexual abuse—resulting in time added to sentences—or sex offender
labels that last a lifetime, impacting future chances of employment and housing upon
release.138 Second, victims of sexual assault tend to be automatically placed in
solitary confinement “under the pretense that penal officials are providing them with
protection during the investigation.”139 Protective custody not only fails to protect
them (see above), but it also sends a message that those who report assault will be
punished by being placed in SEG.140
The history of PREA makes it easy to see how this piece of legislation fails to
offer adequate protections for trans prisoners. Its passage depended upon an “eclectic
coalition of strange political bedfellows.” 141 Liberal prison reformers, concerned about
prison staff assaulting women, and conservative groups, hyper-anxious about samesex sex between male inmates, banded together to pass the bill. 142 Its passage
ultimately depended upon framing prisons as “intrinsically queer spaces”
characterized by “violent, victimizing, corrupting, and predatory sexuality.”143 Giving
corrections administrators discretion to write up and throw victims of rape and samesex lovers in SEG sends a clear message that PREA—whose passage was motivated
by fear and stigma of sex and HIV/AIDS144—is designed to punish, not protect.
ii.

Mental Health Degradation from Solitary Confinement

The extreme isolation and sensory deprivation of solitary confinement cause
profound deteriorations in prisoners’ mental health. 145 Several studies have
suggested that solitary can cause “insomnia, anxiety, panic, withdrawal,
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

See id. at 186 (“Rapes, very nasty physical assaults, and beatings take place, by other inmates and by
the very same prison personnel who are sworn to protect each and every inmate.”).
See MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 103 (“The grim reality is that even though prison policies prohibit all
sexual activity and violence, in practice prison officials not only allow and count on forcible sex, but use
it to reinforce their own authority.”).
Id. at 109–10 (describing a prison facility in 2009 that sent women to isolation for violating the “no-sex”
rule).
LAW, supra note 75, at 69.
Id. at 70–71.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 103.
Id.
Id. at 105–06.
Id.
Id.
KUNZEL, supra note 84, at 234.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108–09.
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hypersensitivity, ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control,
aggression, rage, paranoia, hopelessness, lethargy, depression, emotional
breakdowns, self-mutilation, and suicidal impulses.”146 It can also cause a specific
psychiatric syndrome associated with hyper-responsivity to external stimuli;
perceptual distortions, illusions, and hallucinations; difficulties thinking,
concentrating, and remembering; intrusive obsessive thoughts; overt paranoia; panic
attacks; and less control over impulses.147
The factors influencing the development of this syndrome and other adverse
psychiatric consequences include the intensity and duration of sensory deprivation,
the perceived intent of the isolation, and individual variability. 148 As length of time
and the severity of sensory deprivation increases, so does the risk of deteriorated
psychiatric conditions.149 In addition, perceptions of malicious intent motivating the
isolation and individuals with chaotic or fearful internal emotional lives also
positively correlate with increased risk for psychiatric deterioration in solitary.150
Because transgender prisoners are likely to spend substantial portions of their
sentence in solitary151—for reasons that can reasonably be perceived as malicious
intent on the part of transphobic guards or policies, especially if segregation is
automatic152—trans prisoners are most at risk to develop severe adverse psychiatric
conditions as a result of a prison sentence.
The long-term effects of solitary confinement leave little hope for successful
reentry into mainstream society. Symptoms of post-traumatic stress and persistent
changes in personality may last for decades.153 Other symptoms—like “flashbacks,
chronic hypervigilance, and a pervasive sense of hopelessness” and “pattern[s] of
intolerance of social interaction, [which] leav[e] the individual socially impoverished

146
147

148
149
150
151
152

153

Donald, supra note 39, at 33 (quoting Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A
Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477,
530 (1997)).
Grassian, supra note 39, at 333–37. Certified psychiatrist and former Harvard Medical School faculty
member Stuart Grassian examined over two hundred prisoners in confinement conditions and observed
that solitary “caused either severe exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance
of an acute mental illness in individuals who had previously been free of any such illness.” Id. at 333.
He concluded from his research that “[t]he restriction of environmental stimulation and social isolation
associated with solitary are strikingly toxic to mental functioning, producing a stuporous condition
associated with perceptual and cognitive impairment and affective disturbances.” Id. at 354.
Id. at 346–48.
Id.
Id.
See Harada, supra note 76, at 634 (describing how Miki Ann DiMarko spent fourteen months in
confinement characterized as “stark, almost dungeon-like housing quarters”) (quoting DiMarco v. Wyo.
Dep’t of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (D. Wyo. 2004)).
See id. at 645–46 (“Although the physical harm attendant to placement in the general population may
be mitigated by placement in protective custody or administrative segregation, the denial of interaction
with other human beings and extreme isolation may bring their own psychological harms. This may be
especially acute for the transgender prisoner where that isolation is a result of transgender status
alone.”).
Grassian, supra note 39, at 353.

318

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[6:2

and withdrawn, subtly angry, and fearful when forced into social interaction” 154—can
severely impair a newly-released prisoner from being able to reintegrate into society.
It is hard enough for transgender people to get a job, 155 let alone with a criminal
record and with lasting—and arguably legally disabling156—psychological injuries
from incarceration. The Congressional push away from rehabilitation has given trial
judges at sentencing fewer incentives to investigate the injustices of confinement that
detract from rehabilitative goals.157 If sentencing is not about rehabilitation, then the
damage of solitary is not questioned.
iii.

Disparate Treatment in Prison is Disparate Treatment at
Sentencing

The high degree of violence and isolation and the devastating health effects
that they have on transgender prisoners disproportionately punishes trans people for
their crimes.158 Incarcerated trans people must contend with the dangers of physical
and sexual assault—in conjunction with the mental harms from long-term, extreme
sensory deprivation—even though these additional punishments are not written in
the Guidelines or considered by trial judges as part of the original sentence.159
Congress did not think about trans people when restricting judicial authority to make
case-by-case sentencing decisions. The Congressional push away from concerns about
rehabilitation has increased, rather than decreased, disparities in sentencing for
trans folks because there are no checks at sentencing that would require case-specific
actors to look into the devastating effects that prisons have on trans people.160 While
the Congressional push for uniform sentences may decrease disparities on paper,
disparate punishments continue to proliferate within systems of punishment that
directly translate into disparate sentencing for transgender inmates.
Trans prisoners are also likely to have their identities unacknowledged161 and
their medical resources of transition either denied or sporadically offered. 162 These
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & THE NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 1–2 (2009),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/transsurvey_prelim_findings.pdf.
The legal definition of disability, according to the amended Americans with Disabilities Act, is
predicated upon an individual’s ability to perform “major life activities” like work. See 42 U.S.C. §
12102 (2009).
See Part I, supra.
Colopy, supra note 6, at 267.
Id. at 268.
See supra Part I, A.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 110 (discussing the prison legal system’s refusal to recognize chosen
names and gender identities and its refusal to offer clothing, especially undergarments, that matches
chosen identities).
Blanket denials of essential medical treatments violate the Eighth Amendment, but corrections
administrators are given so much discretion to weigh “ancillary factors”—like availability, cost, and
security risks—that it is easy to avoid an Eighth Amendment violation. Bourcicot & Woofter, supra
note 62, at 294; Colopy, supra note 6, at 250, 254–55. There is also no Eighth Amendment violation for
denying hormone treatment to people who cannot prove via documentation that they obtained a legal
prescription prior to incarceration. MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 111–12. Obtaining hormones can be
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denials result in not just psychological163 but also physiological164 damage. These
harms are additional punishments 165 that cisgender prisoners do not have to face,
even if they have committed similar crimes. These harms are—in addition to the
violence and isolation discussed above—not part of trans inmates’ original
punishment at sentencing, but they still contribute to trans folks’ overall experience
of punishment in prisons.
Assuming the effects of disparate punishments did not exist, trans people still
receive longer sentences on a whole than cisgender people.166 Rather than due to
judicial bias across the board—even though the presence of transphobic bias is
statistically probable among judges167—trans defendants spend longer time in prison
because their—sometimes automatic—placement in SEG precludes participation in
prerelease programs and can even result in stacking additional time onto their
sentences.168 The practical effects of spending the majority of a sentence in SEG, a
punishment mechanism within a system of punishment, are that trans people are

163

164
165

166

167

168

an “insurmountable obstacle” for people who cannot afford to regularly see or who live far from
endocrinologists willing to treat them. Id. Although it is BOP policy to continue treatment for those
with a legal prescription, many trans people still get their hormones cut off upon entering prison
because they started hormones underground. Id. Even for those who have adequate documentation,
“[treatment] is often provided sporadically, inconsistently, at inappropriate dosages, and without
accompanying psychological support, [which] endanger[s] transgender inmates’ health and wellbeing.”
Id. Sometimes the guidelines for medical care for trans inmates can be “insufficient or not followed.”
Lamble, supra note 6, at 244.
Some scholars have suggested that refusing to recognize a transgender person’s identity is “a
psychological harm in and of itself.” Harada, supra note 76, at 645. In addition, the WPATH Standards
of Care insist that hormone therapy be continued because discontinuance can cause “extreme mental
distress and anguish,” including emotional instability, humiliating physical changes, and severe
psychological reactions like depression, anxiety, and suicidal tendencies. MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at
112; Colopy, supra note 6, at 263–64; Hagner, supra note 2, at 850–51.
See LAW, supra note 75, at 202 (“For transgender women, whose bodies are accustomed to regular
estrogen intake, [hormone] withdrawal can cause heart problems, irregular blood pressure, hot flashes,
anxiety, panic attacks, hair loss, and difficulty with short-term memory and concentration.”).
See Colopy, supra note 6, at 268; Faithful, supra note 1, at 3 (“Our prison system . . . further sentences
[trans people] to live within their own bodies’ betrayal.”); Hagner, supra note 2, at 850–51 (“Denial of
gender affirming medical care can result in . . . a ‘very invasive loss of sovereignty over one’s own
body.’”).
See, e.g., MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 107–08 (SEG prevents participation in programs and other
opportunities for early release); LAW, supra note 75, at 204 (SEG reduces access to programming and
increases psychological distress); Lamble, supra note 6, at 244 (SEG is an additional system of
punishment within prisons); Colopy, supra note 6, at 268 (automatic SEG placement is effectively
punishment for being transgender).
Transphobia can manifest in implicit bias against transgender clients. See Byrgen Finkelman,
Transphobic Judges—A Worry Cis Folks Don’t Have, TIMES UNION: TRANSGENDER TALK (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://blog.timesunion.com/transgender/transphobic-judges-a-worry-cis-folks-dont-have/1593
(“Cisgender people never have to think about how transphobia can derail something as simple as a
name change and make a life unnecessarily difficult.”). The presence of federal judges vehemently
against transgender rights advocacy has also increased in the first year of the Trump presidency. See,
e.g., Kevin Diaz, Trump Pick for Federal Judge in Texas Slammed Transgender Rights as ‘Satan’s
Plan’, MY SAN ANTONIO (Sept. 21, 2017, 12:00 A.M.),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/Trump-pick-for-federal-judge-in-Texas-slammed12216466.php.
See, e.g., LAW, supra note 75, at 204; MOGUL ET AL., supra note 6, at 108.
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locked up longer and with more deleterious effects than their cisgender counterparts.
In the end, trans people are disparately sentenced “for their own protection.”
Trans people are therefore punished more harshly than similarly situated
cisgender defendants because they experience more violence, confinement,
inadequate medical treatment, and devastating physical and mental health problems
in prisons. If trial judges were able to consider these additional punishments at
sentencing, Guidelines variances could be justified with concerns to avoid what is, in
effect, disparate sentencing. But it does not seem like judges actually consider these
abuses as disparate sentences—or there would be more Guidelines variances for
trans defendants on these bases.
iv.

Higher Rates of Recidivism out of Necessity to Survive

Many incarcerated transgender people committed financially-motivated
crimes—like theft, credit card and identity fraud, sex work, and drug trafficking.169
This is usually because medical procedures of transition are expensive and out-ofpocket,170 but it is also because there is a cumulative effect on the ability for visible
trans people to survive in a society where transphobic stigma produces discrimination
in access—or unsafe access—to housing, employment, health care, education, and
public benefits and safety nets like homeless and domestic violence shelters and
169

170

Taking hormones, if not provided by a doctor’s prescription, can put trans people behind bars for illicit
drug activity. Suppliers, trans people who can obtain multiple prescriptions, are also at risk of
incarceration. See Lori A. Saffin, Identities Under Siege: Violence Against Transpersons of Color, in
CAPTIVE GENDERS, supra note 3, at 151.
In 2014, the Affordable Care Act lifted Medicaid’s broad coverage exclusions for transgender medical
procedures like hormone replacement therapy and surgeries; but since then, only ten states (plus D.C.)
amended their rules to remove these exclusions, with the remaining states still either explicitly
excluding or not even mentioning coverage for gender-affirming medical procedures. See Kellan Baker,
Ashe McGovern, Sharita Gruberg, & Andrew Cray, The Medicaid Program and LGBT Communities:
Overview and Policy Recommendations, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2016/08/09/142424/the-medicaid-program-andlgbt-communities-overview-and-policy-recommendations. Private insurers are also still able to broadly
exclude coverage for trans-related medical procedures, and many couch exclusions in other neutral
language like “cosmetic” or “[not] medically necessary.” OUT 2 ENROLL, REPORT ON TRANS EXCLUSIONS IN
2017 MARKETPLACE PLANS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1 (2017), https://out2enroll.org/out2enroll/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/Report-on-Trans-Exclusions-in-2017-Marketplace-Plans.pdf.
The out-of-pocket costs of transition vary based on what kinds of medical procedure each trans person
needs to alleviate their dysphoria. The total cost of multiple gender-affirming surgeries—including
facial, breast, fat distribution, and “bottom” surgeries—can add up to over $100,000 depending on the
type and number of procedures performed. See Alyssa Jackson, The High Cost of Being Transgender,
CNN.COM (July 31, 2015) (citing Female to Male Price List, PHILA. CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER SURGERY,
http://www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/femaletomale1/ftm-price-list.html; Male to Female
Price List, PHILA. CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER SURGERY,
http://www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/mtf-price-list.html),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/health/transgender-costs-irpt/index.html. The cost of hormone
replacement therapy—which once started is usually continued for the rest of a trans person’s life—
depends on the frequency of doctor visits and required lab panels, which can add up to $1500 per year
or more. See Elle Bradford, You Won’t Believe How Much It Costs to Be Transgender in America, TEEN
VOGUE (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/transgender-operations-hormone-therapycosts (documenting one trans woman’s experience with her financial costs of transition).
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Medicaid.171 The lack of safety nets disproportionately affects trans people who tend
to be poor, criminalized, and imprisoned at much higher rates. 172
Many low-income trans people have less normatively-accepted, “productive”
labor skills—since some are forced to drop out of school early on due to abusive
bullying or familial rejection173—so they do not have as many opportunities to make
incomes in mainstream markets. 174 Rampant employment discrimination prevents
even normatively qualified trans people from getting jobs, and workplace abuse
pushes trans people out of the jobs they already had.175 Lack of employment
opportunities incentivize criminalized behaviors to make an income, pay for
transition, and/or cope with poverty.176 Trans people are also much more likely to
commit crimes associated with poverty like loitering, sleeping in public, and
panhandling.177 Contemporary studies have shown that specific vulnerable
populations of queer and trans AMABs178 are disproportionately at risk of being
incarcerated for drug-, status-, and property-related crimes.179
171

172

173
174
175
176
177

178
179

LAW, supra note 75, at 201–02; see also Colopy, supra note 6, at 236, 238; Saffin, supra note 169, at 151
(describing the economic need that propels many trans women of color into sex work as the only means
for survival and how participation puts them at risk of harassment, violence, and constant surveillance
from police). See generally GRANT ET AL., supra note 32, at 2–8 (executive summary of survey
documenting rates of discrimination in employment, education, housing, public accommodations,
health care, police response, and prison treatment).
LAW, supra note 75, at 201–02; Colopy, supra note 6, at 238–39 (“Comparing even the more common
male-to-female transsexual birth rate of one in 12,000 to the estimated rate in federal prison of one in
2,100, it becomes evident that transsexual incarceration rates are disproportionate to those of the
general population.”).
See GRANT ET AL., supra note 32, at 8, 10 (dropping out as a major negative life event listed).
See LAW, supra note 75, at 201–02.
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & THE NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 155, at 1–2;
GRANT ET AL., supra note 32, at 53–62.
See GRANT ET AL., supra note 32, at 3, 64–66 (noting that sixteen percent of the total sample had
experience in criminalized work and that almost thirty percent of respondents who were unemployed or
had lost jobs due to bias had participated in underground economies).
LAW, supra note 75, at 201–02. The history of criminalizing poverty has its roots in the immediate
aftermath of the Civil War, where white Southern legislatures responded with backlash to the
emancipation of slaves by passing black codes and vagrancy laws criminalizing freedmen’s status as
poor. See ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 28.
Unfortunately, transgender women oftentimes get thrown in with “gay men” in research studies.
A 2008 study in in Miami, Florida looked at gay and bisexual men’s involvement with the criminal
justice system. Steven P. Kurtz, Arrest Histories of High-Risk Gay and Bisexual Men in Miami:
Unexpected Additional Evidence for Syndemic Theory, 40 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 513 (2008). This
study looked a study in California that found that among gay and bisexual men, “(1) prior substance
abuse treatment history was the strongest predictor of arrest; (2) current employment was a protective
factor; and (3) sex exchanges for money and drugs and a history of STD infection were predictive of
prior arrest.” Id at 3 (citing Dennis G. Fisher et al., Arrest History Among Men and Sexual
Orientation, 50 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 32 (2004)). The 2008 study also found that the largest predictors
of criminal activity were substance abuse—especially crack and powder cocaine use—prior abuse,
economic instability and homelessness, higher levels of mental health distress and sex sensation
seeking, and lower education levels. The majority of crimes were drug and alcohol related (38.7% of
participants), with possession and distribution arrests the highest (28.2%). Status crimes (37.1%)
closely followed. Property crimes (28.2%) were more associated with theft than violence, with 46%
arrested for larceny, shoplifting, burglary, or stolen goods. 19.4% were arrested for violent crimes, but
arrests for aggravated and simple assault and battery (21.8%) far outnumbered those for robbery
(6.5%). Id at 13.
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Once released from prison, transgender ex-prisoners are at a much higher risk
of reoffending and returning to prison. 180 All ex-prisoners can be legally denied access
to government welfare and housing programs, and private employment
opportunities.181 This is particularly devastating for trans ex-prisoners whose
difficulties getting a job and finding safe housing have increased exponentially.182 The
“cycle of racialized gender policing, marginalization, and discrimination” starts over
upon release,183 when trans ex-prisoners have become even more isolated from
networks and safety nets, making them even more likely to participate in
underground economies to survive. Violating probation, reoffending, or even just
being at the wrong place at the wrong time—because of high police surveillance rates
of low-income communities184—propels them right back into prison.
If trial judges at sentencing considered how trans people become so vulnerable
to recidivism, because of how the stigma of criminality compounds with stigmas of
gender non-conformity, then prison sentences could be shorter or even eliminated in
favor of lesser sanctions. But trial judges are anchored to the Guidelines, never
incentivized to think about anything more than what the Sentencing Commission—
and thereby Congress—gives them. The fact that Congress has pushed for more
“tough on crime” legislation185 and has seriously devalued the importance of
considering rehabilitation and specific defendant characteristics at sentencing speaks
volumes when one remembers that ex-felons are legally barred from voting.186
CONCLUSIONS – TRANSCEND THE SYSTEM
Congress’s obsession with uniformity is an attempt to reduce unwarranted
sentencing disparities, but disparities continue to permeate the U.S. criminal justice
system.187 Forcing trial judges to be “blind” to issues of race, class, and gender does
not eliminate oppression and instead allows judges to continue using racist, sexist,
and classist rhetoric, but under a new, legitimized name.188 As long as judges can
come up with any reason other than race, sex, class, or other deviations from norms
in order to sentence someone at the higher end of the range or give a longer sentence
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181
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183
184
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188

Oparah, supra note 74, at 268.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 144–54; Oparah, supra note 74, at 266.
See Oparah, supra note 74, at 268 (“The stigma of a criminal record interacts with existing social
stigmas related to race, class, and gender non-conformity to further sediment social exclusion and limit
the range of available options.”).
Id.
See SPADE, supra note 33, at 120–21.
Oparah, supra note 74, at 268.
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 158–61.
See supra, Part I.
SPADE, supra note 33, at 113–14 (explaining that courts can uphold racist and sexist laws and programs
as neutral and fair while relying on racist and sexist images that promoted the passage of these laws
and programs).
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than similarly situated defendants, then the sentence is justified.189 Responding to
active injustices of systemic marginalization with legal rules and policies that
advocate for colorblindness or gender-blindness literally refuses to see the problem.
Trial judges should be given more discretion to consider systemic oppression
that contributes to the criminalization of marginalized identities. The sentencing
regime should anchor forward-looking, rather than backward-looking, thinking.190
Judges should be encouraged to use their discretion to vary from the Guidelines.191
Lesser sanctions—and especially alternatives to punishment—should always be
available to defendants whose unique positions in society put them at such a high
risk of violence in, and damaging outcomes from, prison. No punishment involving
cages, regardless of its purpose, would be effective for these kinds of defendants.192
While judges are more visible and accountable than bureaucratic corrections
institutions, there are definite limitations to framing a solution in terms of
demanding judges to “be better.” First, clearly race- or gender-based sentencing
would violate Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.193 Second, no matter how much it is
given to them, some judges might never use their discretion to vary in favor of lesser
sanctions and may even go so far as to increase penalties.194 Third, the President
selects federal judges for lifetime tenure, and not many trans-friendly judges have
been (or are likely to continue to be) appointed during this ultra-conservative and
regressive political climate.195
189

190

191
192

193
194
195

Judges can come up with a whole bunch of “legitimate” reasons to incarcerate a homeless trans person
of color (who uses her stolen money for transition) longer than a blue collar white cis-male worker
(using his stolen money to “provide” for his family), even if both of them committed similar crimes in
similar circumstances.
Rather than look back to the offense and concoct an adequate punishment, the Guidelines should make
judges look at the long-term consequences of prison to determine a sentence based off the likelihood of
reintegration upon release. Structuring the Guidelines around long-term, rather than short-term,
solutions makes sense when considering that most people in prison eventually get out with very little
prospects for the future.
For trans people, unique risk factors associated with being transgender in a facility that does not match
one’s preferred gender presentation should be adequate cause for Guidelines variances. Colopy, supra
note 6, at 269.
Considering that most trans prisoners will spend the vast majority of their time in solitary and that
long-term confinement results in devastating mental deterioration, trial judges should use deterrence
concerns to justify Guidelines variances because solitary produces even more vulnerabilities that
increase the likelihood of committing future survival crimes in relation to mental illness. See supra
Part III.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding race-based classifications subject to strict scrutiny);
Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender-based classifications subject to intermediate
scrutiny).
See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (justifying the death penalty with
individualist rehabilitation punishment theory).
According to Lambda Legal, the current president has nominated at least sixteen federal judges with
anti-LGBT records. LAMBDA LEGAL, TRUMP’S JUDICIAL ASSAULT ON LGBT RIGHTS: A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF
TRUMP’S RESHAPING OF THE COURTS ONE YEAR IN 3 (2017),
https://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/legaldocs/downloads/trumps_judicial_assault_on_lgbt_rights_2017.pdf. The newest Supreme Court Justice
Neil Gorsuch has a long history of hostility toward LGBT people and other marginalized communities.
LAMBDA LEGAL, Neil Gorsuch Has an Unacceptable, Hostile Record Towards LGBT People, LAMBDA
LEGAL BLOG (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20170131_no-to-neil-gorsuch. In 2015, he
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The structure of the entire criminal justice system needs to change. Prisons
should be abolished, and punishment should no longer be at the crux of justice
because it is a manipulative response to harm,196 and it is ineffective at changing
behaviors.197 Lesser sanctions, while preferable to prisons, can also be inadequate
because they “simply replace old cages with new ones.” 198 Punishment and its
purposes should be altogether abandoned in favor of alternatives that instead
promote providing people with adequate programs and care for the purposes of
healing and reparative justice.199
The problem starts with the entire system, and it is not going to go away by
telling judges to use their discretion better. It starts not just with implicit judicial
bias but also with heavy police surveillance of low-income neighborhoods of color200
and increased funding to policing and prosecution but decreased funding to public
defense attorneys.201 It starts with drug laws designed to criminalize people among
racial and socioeconomic categories who supposedly use those drug forms more. 202 It
will only go away if we dismantle the cages. Top-down reforms work about as well as
trickle-down economics.203 Something gets lost along the way, whether it is money to
offshore bank accounts or diffused responsibility for getting reparations to
marginalized populations.

196
197
198
199

200
201

202

203

joined an opinion that rejected arguments made by a transgender prisoner that her Constitutional
rights were violated by the Oklahoma DOC for denying her medically necessary hormone therapy and
gender-appropriate clothing. LAMBDA LEGAL, We Reviewed All of Gorsuch’s Record. Here’s What We
Found, LAMBDA LEGAL BLOG (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20170131_gorsuchrecord. The opinion implied that the DOC’s housing and clothing choices for her were rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose. Id. (quoting Druley v. Patton, 601 Fed. Appx. 632, 635–36 (10th Cir.
2015)).
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 7 (noting that governments primarily use punishment as a tool of social
control).
Lamble, supra note 6, at 251 (noting how prisons are ineffective mechanisms for deterrence and
rehabilitation).
Id. at 253 (referencing house arrest, surveillance cameras, probation, fines, etc. that can still lead to
prison time).
See id. at 252–54 (“Creating abolitionist alternatives means encouraging non-punitive responses to
harm [and] enacting community-based modes of accountability . . . [like] transformative justice
initiatives, community-based restitution, social and economic support networks, affordable housing,
community education projects, youth-led recreation programs, free accessible healthcare services,
empowerment-based mental health, addiction and harm reduction programs, quality employment
opportunities, and support for self-determination struggles.”).
SPADE, supra note 33, at 120–21.
The disparities are appalling in state systems that allocate the majority of their federal dollars to
prosecution and law enforcement. THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO
REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4 (2013),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Gideon_Report_040913.pdf.
See THE HOUSE I LIVE IN (BBC News 2012) (explaining the history of criminalizing drugs as a tool for
race- and class-based oppression by associating smoking opium with Chinese laborers, marijuana with
Latinx laborers, heroin and crack-cocaine with Black folks, and meth with queers and low-income rural
white folks).
The assertion here is that all theories that assume giving to those with privilege will “eventually” get to
those on the margins just do not work. See SPADE, supra note 33, at 91–92 (critiquing rights-based, topdown reforms in hate crimes legislation); Mehran Etebari, Trickle-Down Economics: Four Reasons Why
It Just Doesn’t Work, FAIR ECON. (July 17, 2003),
http://www.faireconomy.org/trickle_down_economics_four_reasons.
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True uniformity will always fail, but so too does true proportionality. Codes of
“morality” and considerations of a defendant’s worth—based off of expectations of
productivity in a capitalist system that privileges conformity to norms of whiteness,
respectability, and the ability to produce and reproduce white labor—still structure
judicial decisions to sentence, regardless of whether judges are conscious of it.
Congress’s focus on uniformity as the solution to sentencing disparities has only
reduced disparities on paper; but in reality, it has increased disparities in actual
punishments. The system will always be biased, and unless we replace cages and
punishment with care and reparations, the injustices will never end.

